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On the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts: A Critique of Shaun Gallagher’s 
Neurophenomenological Account of Thought Insertion 
 





This paper explores the phenomenon of thought insertion, an experience reported by some 
schizophrenics where it is believed that other persons or forces are inserting thoughts into their 
minds. This relatively circumscribed symptom of schizophrenia raises difficult questions 
concerning our sense of agency for our thoughts. How is it possible that persons can think that 
their thoughts are not their own? Gallagher, drawing on Husserl’s early work on time-
consciousness, provides a subtle and sophisticated answer to this problem, suggesting that 
protention may underlie our sense of agency for thinking and that the experience of inserted 
thoughts may occur in the event of an intermittent failure in this protentional function. More 
recent Husserl scholarship suggests, however, that this account may face problems on 
phenomenological grounds. It is argued here that our sense of agency for thinking requires more 
than protention, and, consequently, that the absence of protention cannot fully explain the loss of 
agency for thinking characterizing the experience of thought insertion. In order to contextualize 
this discussion of the phenomenon theoretically and, in the process, to provide an introduction to 
the difficulties in explaining it, this paper proceeds with a consideration of Frith’s early cognitive 
account of thought insertion and the contribution of Stephens and Graham in this regard. In 
conclusion, it is argued that, despite the merits of all three accounts presented, they remain unable 
to account for the phenomenon of inserted thoughts, and that we might more fruitfully understand 






What does it mean when persons claim that other 
persons or forces are inserting thoughts into their 
minds? A person may claim, for example, that 
“Thoughts are put into my mind like ‘Kill God’. It’s 
just like my mind is working, but it isn’t. They come 
from this chap Chris. They’re his thoughts” (as cited 
in Frith, 1992, p. 66). In similar vein, a patient 
explains: “I look out of the window and I think that 
the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the 
thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. 
There are no other thoughts there, only his … . He 
treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts 
onto it like you flash a picture” (Mellor, 1970, p. 17). 
Jaspers (1997) suggests that claims of this kind are 
what make schizophrenia1 “quite incomprehensible, 
difficult to imagine and not open to empathy” (p. 
122). There are clear difficulties in attempting to 
                                                 
1 Although classically associated with schizophrenia, 
thought insertion is not a complaint restricted to this 
disorder. It has been found to be present in, for example, 
mood disorders, psychotic depression, and the atypical 
psychoses. It is, however, sufficient for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia if present for at least one month in the 
absence of an organic or mood disorder. See Mullins and 
Spence, 2003. 
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understand this type of experiential claim. For 
example, it must be the case that the person’s thought, 
in which he thinks “this is not my own thought”, is 
his own thought, which thus implies that only some 
thoughts are or can be experienced as inserted.  
 
In order both to provide some background to the 
central theme of this work and to elucidate some of 
the problems surrounding the conceptualisation of 
this symptom, I will first briefly review two attempts 
to render intelligible the experience of inserted 
thoughts and explain how it may manifest. 
Christopher Frith has argued in his The Cognitive 
Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia (1992) and earlier 
papers (for example, Frith, 1987) that the experience 
of thought insertion may be understood in terms of a 
breakdown in self-monitoring such that “intentions to 
think” are no longer recognised. Frith has more 
recently abandoned this view (see, for instance, Frith, 
2004), but it is nevertheless reviewed here in that it is 
often uncritically invoked in contemporary literature 
and provides for a good introductory understanding of 
the problems inherent in explaining this type of 
experience. One of the central problems that emerge 
from Frith’s work on the difference between intended 
and unintended thoughts is successfully resolved by 
Stephens and Graham (2000) in their When Self-
Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted 
Thoughts. However, their explanation of why a 
person claims that some of his or her thoughts are 
inserted runs counter to phenomenological intuition 
and leaves several key questions unresolved. 
 
The next section is devoted to a detailed explication 
of Shaun Gallagher’s (2005) “alternative neuro-
phenomenological account” as developed in his How 
the Body Shapes the Mind, with the same argument 
drawn upon here detailed by Gallagher in several 
other publications (including, but not restricted to, 
Gallagher, 2000, 2004). Here Gallagher offers a 
sophisticated and robust account, drawing on 
Husserl’s analyses of time-consciousness, in which he 
suggests that thought insertion may be understood if 
we supposed that the neurological mechanism 
underlying protention intermittently failed. Although 
Gallagher’s account successfully resolves a number 
of problems inherent in the earlier models, and further 
goes some way towards accounting for perceptual 
disturbances in schizophrenic experience, it appears 
unable to account for the experience of inserted 
thoughts on phenomenological grounds. This 
argument is detailed in section four, where it is 
argued that our sense of agency for thinking requires 
more than protention, and, consequently, that the 
absence of protention cannot fully explain the loss of 
agency for thinking associated with the experience of 
thought insertion. This leads to a different way of 
understanding the phenomenon of inserted thoughts, 
which I suggest, by way of conclusion, is a type of 
uncontrollable autochthonous or passive thinking, 
where “autochthonous thinking” is understood as the 
experience of “rambling thoughts that occur 
automatically and continuously” (Honda et al., 2004, 
p. 474), for which we never have any sense of agency. 
 
Two Early Accounts of Thought Insertion 
 
The most widely cited and uncritically invoked 
explanation of thought insertion is Frith’s early 
cognitive model, which is derived from explanations 
of motor control and cast in terms of a more general 
theory designed to account for passivity-phenomena 
such as delusions of control as well as auditory 
hallucinations. Frith’s explanation relies on the 
components of “efference copy” and a self-
monitoring system or “comparator”: hypothetical 
components which have served successfully in 
explaining aspects of motor action, such as how we 
distinguish between self-initiated movements and 
involuntary or passive movements (for example, a 
muscle spasm or someone else lifting my arm, 
respectively). Frith proceeds to extrapolate from such 
explanations of motor action and suggests that 
thought insertion results from a defect in a self-
monitoring system whereby a thought may arrive as 
unintended and thus be interpreted as alien. To 
explain, he supposes that the experience of thought 
insertion “implies that we have some way of 
recognizing our own thoughts. It is as if each thought 
has a label on it saying ‘mine’. If this labelling 
process goes wrong, then the thought would be 
perceived as alien” (Frith, 1992, p. 80).   
 
With respect to self-initiated actions, Frith refers to 
the “monitoring of intentions to move” and 
accordingly assumes that willed-thinking is preceded 
by an intention to think. He makes this quite clear in 
an earlier paper where he asserts that the “experience 
of thoughts being initiated without any intention to 
have them would be described by the patient as 
thought insertion” (Frith, 1987, p. 639). Thus, for 
Frith, the problems manifest in schizophrenia with 
respect to action, such as delusions of alien control2, 
are not simply the result of an impairment in the 
monitoring of actions, but indicative of an impairment 
in the monitoring of the intentions to act. In delusions 
of control, the problem resides, in this account, in a 
failure to monitor willed-intentions; the patient acts 
on the basis of willed intentions, but, as a result of a 
defect in central monitoring, the patient is unaware of 
                                                 
2 As the term suggests, this is a symptom of schizophrenia 
in which the person believes that his or her actions are 
under the control of another person or force. 
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her intentions to act. The central defect for Frith is, 
therefore, a defect in metarepresentation, a second-
order reflexive awareness of our intentions. He thus 
suggests that, if thinking is like a motor process, then 
thought insertion may be explained in terms of a 
failure to register the intention to think at the central 
monitor. In his now (in)famous formulation he states: 
 
Thinking, like all our actions, is normally 
accompanied by a sense of effort and 
deliberate choice as we move from one 
thought to the next. If we found ourselves 
thinking without any awareness of the 
sense of effort that reflects central 
monitoring, we might well experience 
these thoughts as alien and, thus, as being 
inserted into our minds. (Frith, 1992, p. 81) 
 
The sense of the willed generation of thoughts is thus, 
in Frith’s model, dependent on the sense of effort 
associated with thinking. It is the effort that reflects 
central monitoring that characterises intended 
thoughts, with unintended thoughts being ‘stimulus-
driven’. 
 
A great deal of critical ink has been spilled to show 
the implausibility of this account of thought insertion. 
Various commentators have noted the seeming 
“regress of intentions” involved in Frith’s account, as 
well as difficulties associated with distinguishing 
between willed and stimulus-driven intentions, 
particularly with regard to thoughts, and the fact that 
his theory does not allow for a clear distinction 
between thought-influence3 and thought insertion, and 
consequently cannot explain why the unbidden 
thought is experienced as arising from an external 
agency. There are many more difficulties with Frith’s 
account of thought insertion than those listed here, but 
perhaps the most problematic is that, in our normal 
phenomenology, thinking is not always accompanied 
by a sense of effort. While it may be evident on 
occasion, it is certainly not a general characteristic of 
thinking, which is usually experienced as fluid and 
effortless. Further criticisms levelled at Frith’s 
account will be outlined in the course of explicating 
other explanatory models. 
 
Stephens and Graham (2000) argue for a clarification 
of Frith’s notion of intended and unintended thoughts 
and, in the light of Frith’s suggestion that “my sense 
that I did not intend to think a particular thought is 
                                                 
3 The difference between thought insertion and thought 
influence resides in the fact that, in the latter case, the 
person does not deny that the thoughts are his or her own 
but rather claims that his or her thinking is being influenced 
by another agency or force. 
 
intimately tied up with my sense that this thought is 
not mine” (p. 152), offer two ways of understanding 
how a person might experience a thought as his or her 
own. On the one hand, we can speak of the sense of 
subjectivity of the thought, where the thought is 
understood as belonging to one’s psychological 
history. On the other hand, we can speak of the sense 
of agency for the thought, whereby one understands 
the thought to be something one thinks, and as such a 
result of one’s own activity as opposed to something 
that merely happens to one. Stephens and Graham 
thus show that it is conceptually intelligible for a 
person to claim that a thought is both one’s own and 
not one’s own, as one is expressing the fact that one 
can be the subjective owner of the thought without 
being the agent of that thought. This renders coherent 
the possibility of the phenomenon of thought 
insertion, where it is suggested that the two distinct 
strands of self-consciousness - subjectivity and 
agency  -  unravel. However, this does not explain 
why the subject attributes the unbidden or passive 
thoughts to another agency or force. In this regard, 
Stephens and Graham suggest that our sense of 
agency is grounded in or founded on our recognition 
that our actions, thoughts, beliefs and desires fit in 
with our overall conception of ourselves and the kind 
of person we consider ourselves to be. Following on 
from this theory of agency, they hypothesise that the 
patient denies “that she is the agent of a given thought 
because she finds that she cannot explain its 
occurrence in terms of her theory or conception of her 
intentional psychology” (2000, p. 162). If we find 
ourselves doing, saying or thinking things that do not 
make sense in terms of our overall conception of 
ourselves, we have, according to the authors, one of 
two options: we may (1) revise our theory of our own 
intentional psychology, and accordingly broaden our 
conception of ourselves to include what was an 
unexpected anomalous thought, desire or action, or 
(2) deny that the episode was the product of our own 
agency and attribute the thought, action or desire to 
an external agency or force. 
 
Stephens and Graham (2000) thus propose that all 
that is necessary is that the active thoughts are 
“inexplicable” when seen in terms of one’s own 
intentional psychology: “what our account of the 
sense of mental agency presupposes is that the subject 
will not accept as agentically her own thoughts whose 
occurrence she finds inexplicable by reference to her 
conception or self-referential description of her 
intentional states” (p. 170). However, a further step is 
still required to explain why the subject claims that 
such inexplicable thoughts come from an external 
agency or force; the explanation thus far still fails to 
explain why the person does not simply dismiss such 
thoughts as wanderings of the mind, that is, as passive 
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thinking. Why, we might also ask, do Stephens and 
Graham assume that the inserted thought is actively 
produced? Their account introduces and relies upon a 
distinction between active and passive thinking, and 
yet they assume that the inserted thoughts are the 
result of active agency which is then denied as it does 
not fit with the patient’s self-referential narrative. 
Passive thoughts, by contrast, already lack a sense of 
agency and, if only for this reason, thus seem better 
candidates for being labelled “inserted”.  
 
Stephens and Graham (2000) suggest that it is 
because the thoughts appear as intentional that active 
agency is assumed. Although the thoughts do not 
make sense for the subject in terms of her underlying 
intentional psychology, they do appear as “personally 
salient” and “intelligently structured”. The authors 
suggest that this is in contrast to unbidden and passive 
thoughts, which are “notable for their lack of fit” (p. 
172) with the contextual situation. This explains why 
the authors place the emphasis on the 
misidentification of active agentive thinking as 
opposed to passive thinking, and makes sense in 
terms of the theory of mind that they subscribe to. 
The inserted thoughts appear coherent and salient and 
thus seem to betray another intentional agency, given 
the subject’s lack of a sense of agency for thoughts 
that do not mesh with his or her self-referential 
narrative or intentional psychology. However, if we 
accept that the person may deny agency for such 
thoughts, in light of understanding agency as being 
self-attributed when thoughts are found to be 
incompatible with one’s conception of oneself, then 
the explanation of why a person would then attribute 
such thoughts to another agency becomes 
unconvincing. Agency, in Stephens and Graham’s 
account, is self-attributed when the thought, action or 
desire fits in with our overall intentional psychology. 
Presumably our attributions of agency to another 
depend on how compatible we see their overt actions 
to be with what we have already seen and know of 
that person’s (overt) behaviours. This makes the 
attribution of agency to others problematic and 
seemingly dependent on knowing a reasonable 
amount about the other. But, in the case of thought 
insertion, we often find that the patient finds only 
particular repetitive phrases to be inserted, such as 
“Kill God”, which does not seem sufficient to betray 
a sense of agency, particularly in light of how the 
authors evidently understand the attribution of agency 
to another. However, the major concern with this 
account must be that the explanation of agency as 
being self-attributed when a thought, action or desire 
fits in with our intentional psychology is not in 
keeping with our normal phenomenology. When I 
move my arm, or think a thought, I rarely find in my 
experience the need to verify that I was in fact the 
agent. The sense of agency is already contained in the 
act itself. In respect of the latter objection, I now turn 
to Gallagher’s account of how we have a sense of 
agency in thinking and how we may explain the 
phenomenon of thought insertion. 
 
Gallagher’s ‘Alternative Neurophenomenological 
Account’ 
 
Gallagher (2005), like Stephens and Graham, has 
developed his model of thought insertion on the basis 
of the conceptual difficulties associated with Frith’s 
early model. Gallagher agrees with Stephens and 
Graham’s distinction between the senses of agency 
and subjectivity (although he substitutes the term 
ownership for subjectivity) and with their contention 
that in schizophrenia these two aspects of self-
consciousness may somehow separate. However, he 
argues that, in the case of normal active voluntary 
movement or thought, the sense of agency and 
ownership are indistinguishable. In that the sense of 
agency is, furthermore, implicit in the action or 
thought itself, there is no need, contrary to Stephens 
and Graham’s view, for one to introspectively 
determine whether or not one is the agent in terms of 
one’s overall intentional psychology. Agency, for 
Gallagher, is built into our voluntary actions and is 
not something one decides upon or verifies after the 
fact. Neither the appeal to intentions to think, nor the 
notion of a feeling of conscious effort in thinking, is 
in keeping with our normal phenomenology. 
Gallagher’s model seeks to overcome two further 
problems for any neurocognitive account of psychotic 
symptoms, namely that symptoms are episodic (that 
is, they do not manifest all of the time), and that they 
are specific (that is, the contents of such experiences 
are not random and meaningless, but are, rather, 
coherent and consistent, salient and personally 
relevant). 
 
In proposing his alternative neurophenomenological 
account of thought insertion, Gallagher (2005) 
appeals to Husserl’s (1928/1990) analyses of time-
consciousness. He proposes that Husserl’s insights 
into the nature of time-consciousness, where 
experienced time is broken down into the three 
abstract phases of the “primal impression” or “now”, 
“retention” and “protention”, may be of value in 
understanding the problems of agency and ownership 
with respect to thinking. It is Gallagher’s suggestion, 
in brief, that it may be retention that underlies the 
sense of ownership for thoughts, and protention that 
provides for a sense of agency in our thinking. By 
virtue of being pre-reflective  -  or, as Gallagher puts 
it, prenoetic  -  the structures of time-consciousness, 
when cashed out in cognitive and neurological terms, 
may be the most parsimonious way of accounting for 
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how the senses of agency and ownership are built into 
or implicit in the very process of thinking itself.  
  
To explain in some detail: the primal impression 
refers to the present or now-phase of the temporal 
object, which needs to be understood as any intended 
object (including a thought or thoughts), which is then 
retained in a retentional continuum of decreasing 
affective force as having just been. This is most easily 
illustrated by considering a tonal sequence, for 
instance C, D, and E. When D replaces C as the 
primal impression, C does not disappear but is held in 
retention, as also when E succeeds D. Thus, “when I 
hear tone E, I am still conscious of the tones D and C, 
but not only that. I am still hearing these two tones 
(and neither remembering nor imagining them). This 
is not to say that there is no difference between our 
consciousness of the present tone E and our 
consciousness of the tones D and C” (Zahavi, 1999, p. 
64). As indicated, C will have less affective force than 
D. Over the course of a melody, then, we see how a 
chain of diminishing retentions is formed. Within this 
temporal horizon one also has protention implicitly 
anticipating what will occur next, although not 
necessarily in a determinate manner. Thus, following 
our example, when tone C is given in the now-phase, 
the protentional aspect of consciousness will be 
implicitly anticipating D and E. More concretely, if 
we know the melody well, we may have a quite 
determinate sense of what is about to occur; but even 
if we are completely unfamiliar with the melody, we 
can see protention operating when something 
unexpected or unusual occurs, for instance when the 
wrong note is hit.  
 
Furthermore, retention has two aspects - the 
longitudinal and the transverse - which pertain, 
respectively, to the retention of the antecedent phases 
of consciousness itself and the continuity of the 
experienced temporal object. Whereas the latter 
relates to our retention of the tones as objects of 
consciousness, the former pertains to consciousness 
as retentional. Thus, while longitudinal retention 
allows me to be conscious of myself as experiencing, 
and as such pertains to the synthetic unity of 
consciousness that is necessary for the experience of 
any object at all, transverse retention retains the past 
phases of the experienced object, as such allowing for 
temporal continuity. It should be noted at this point 
that it is misleading to speak of transverse or 
longitudinal intentionality in respect of temporalizing 
consciousness, as the temporal processes are pre-
phenomenal or subtentional (prenoetic, or pre-
reflective, in Gallagher’s terms), allowing for the 
possibility of intentionality; as such, the terms thus 
cannot be consistently used as though they had 
equivalent senses. 
 
To further clarify these distinctions: as these words 
are read, for example, the meanings are held in 
transverse retention, and an indicative sense of where 
the sentence is going is given in protention. 
Furthermore, as you read these words, it is 
longitudinal retention that allows you to recognize 
that it is you that is reading the words. That is, not 
only the intended objects as just past are held in 
retention, but also the past intentional acts, thus 
providing for the continuity of identity throughout 
temporal experience.  
 
Gallagher (2005) extends this line of thought and 
suggests that there may be both a transverse and a 
longitudinal aspect to protention also. As such, the 
protentional sense would provide not only implicit 
anticipation of where this sentence is going, but also a 
sense that your experiences in the immediate future 
will be experiences for you. Gallagher accordingly 
argues that, “in effect, protention also has what 
Husserl calls a longitudinal aspect - it involves a 
projective sense, not only of what is about to happen, 
but of what I am going to do or experience” (p. 193).  
 
His next step is to distinguish between a type of 
active thinking where thought is generated in a 
“willed and controlled fashion”, and a more passive 
type of thinking where “unbidden thoughts, 
memories, fantasies, and so forth, invade our current 
stream of consciousness”. With respect to the form of 
active thinking implied, he cites the examples of 
thinking through a set of instructions, solving a 
problem, or narrating a story to oneself. In these 
cases, Gallagher (2005) asserts, “I have a sense of 
promoting my thinking along a path that is, or is 
becoming, relatively well-defined. In such cases, the 
protentional aspect of consciousness operates to give 
me the sense of where the thinking process is going in 
its very making, that is, as it is being generated and 
developed” (p. 193). In the case of what Gallagher 
calls passive thinking, we do not have a sense of 
agency. We may, in fact, even be actively resisting 
such thoughts. We need here think only of the 
familiar examples of passive thinking - such as 
daydreaming, intrusive thoughts, and so forth  -  that I 
deny I am the agent of even though they are 
undeniably occurring within my own stream of 
consciousness. Gallagher notes that “protention, in 
such cases, may be working perfectly well, providing 
a sense of where these thoughts are coming from and 
where they are heading [or, for that matter, a 
protentional sense of uncertainty about where they are 
heading], as they are being passively generated, even 
within the framework of an unwanted memory or 
unwelcome fantasy” (p. 194). 
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What would happen, however, if the protentional 
function itself failed? Gallagher (2005) suggests that 
“thinking would continue to happen, but there would 
be neither a sense of agency, nor a sense that these 
thoughts were being passively generated in my 
cognitive system, even though they were appearing in 
my stream of consciousness. I would be unready for 
such thoughts. They would appear as if from 
nowhere, and their occurrence would be sudden and 
unexpected” (p. 194). It needs to be remembered here 
how protention is necessary for the sense of agency 
for thought, yet is still present in passive thinking, 
even if only in providing for a sense of 
indeterminacy. Gallagher continues: 
 
Thought generation, like any experience, is 
normally protentional. Without protention, 
thought continues, but it appears already 
made, not generated by me … . Indeed, this 
may also be the case with intended 
thoughts for which I would normally have 
a sense of agency… My non-observational, 
pre-reflective sense of agency for my own 
thinking, which is normally based on 
anticipatory aspects of experience, will be 
deferred by the lack of protention … . In 
this case, I experience thoughts that seem 
not to be generated by me but seem to have 
anticipated what I want to think. (p. 195)   
 
Thought insertion is thus, for Gallagher, a first-order 
experience, as Frith also holds, but, contrary to Frith, 
Gallagher’s account does not depend on a failure of 
metarepresentation.  
 
Importantly, Gallagher (2005) goes on to consider 
what could cause a failure in the protentional 
mechanism in light of the episodic nature of the 
symptoms and the fact that they have specific 
contents. His suggestion is that there needs to be a 
personal-level trigger, which could be affective 
content, that is, “experiential content that generates 
prenoetic emotional effects” (p. 200). Gallagher’s 
suggestion, then, is that particular affective contents, 
fears or anxieties, significant persons or situations, or 
even patterns of thought, could trigger a failure in the 
protentional function. Moreover, he suggests that “it 
is also possible that this disruption of the protentional 
function could cause a looping effect that would 
reinforce the affective trigger” (p. 200).4  
                                                 
4 This analysis further links up with the diathesis-stress 
model of schizophrenia. Gallagher (2005, p. 201) notes that 
“some personal-level event may trigger the original 
disruption of auto-affective protentional functions -  
functions that in some people, in terms of their neurological 
underpinnings, may be genetically or developmentally 
predisposed to disruption”. Moreover, dopamine seems to 
Finally, this account must still answer why the 
schizophrenic person may attribute agency of some of 
his or her thoughts to someone or something else. 
Drawing on work on what is termed the “Who?” 
system, Gallagher suggests that protentional problems 
may disrupt the integration of signals in the brain that 
are responsible for differentiating between self and 
other. In this regard, the “Who?” system research, and 
the research on mirror neurons, demonstrates that 
there are overlapping areas in the brain that are 
activated both during one’s own movement and in the 
observation of another performing those same 
movements. It is Gallagher’s tentative suggestion that 
a failure of protentional synthesis in different 
neurological centres responsible for differentiating 
between self and other (or non-self) causes a 
confabulation that feeds directly into the first-order 
experience, thus raising the possibility that the 
misattribution of agency may be a genuine report of 
experienced pathology. We turn now to address the 
issue of whether Gallagher’s suggestion of a failure in 
protention is phenomenologically possible, and, if 
not, how this changes the aspects of his theory that 
seem both intuitively and empirically plausible.  
 
Some Phenomenological Problems 
 
An initial concern with the above account is that more 
recent scholarship makes it clear that Husserl thought 
that there is more overlap between retention and 
protention than he detailed in his early work. In 
Husserl’s early theory, we can clearly discern that 
“protentions are ‘motivated’ by retentions, meaning 
that what I anticipate in my immediate future is based 
upon what has just transpired” (Rodemeyer, 2003, p. 
130). For example, in my thinking now, my thoughts 
just prior are held in retention such that I remain 
aware of what I have just thought, which in turn 
influences the direction of my present thinking. 
However, Husserl held that retentions are also 
motivated by protentions. The thought just past is held 
                                                                          
be correlated with and intimately involved in the process 
whereby things become meaningful for us. One of the more 
recent formulations of the function of dopamine is the 
motivational-salience hypothesis. The suggestion is, in 
essence, that dopamine is the neurochemical mediator that 
underpins those aspects of self-experience and the 
environment that become salient or prominent for us. 
Normally, dopamine does not control this process, but it is 
hypothesized that, in schizophrenia, there is a 
“dysregulation of dopamine transmission which then 
becomes the ‘creator of saliencies, albeit aberrant ones’” 
(Kapur, 2003). This explanation appears to link the 
phenomenology with the neurochemistry and the 
psychopharmacology. But it needs to be noted that the 
phenomenology must take precedence, as Gallagher rightly 
indicates, if the problems of episodicity and specificity are 
to be overcome. 
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in retention both as the past thought and as the 
thought formerly protended, thus implying that 
retentions include in themselves the protentions as 
fulfilled or unfulfilled. As Rodemeyer explains, there 
is a complicated way in which the “constituting 
temporal flow overlaps itself ... . Retentions are 
retained as both retentions of what came before (as 
fulfilment) and as their former protentions; each 
retention has a retentional and a protentional aspect” 
(p. 131). Husserl’s later analyses thus replace the 
“now-point” or “primal impression” with the idea of 
fulfilled or unfulfilled protentions. Referring to 
“fulfilled protention” and “fulfilled retention” allows 
us to denote a “zone of actualisation” that avoids the 
effect of “reifying” the temporal processes into a 
momentary “now”. Moreover, and importantly for our 
present analysis, the “zone of actualisation” can now 
be seen to be “contingent upon the form of retention-
protention, and on their being fulfilled” (Rodemeyer, 
2003, p. 131).  
 
To update Gallagher’s analysis, then, it can be stated 
that retentions that provide for a sense of ownership 
“contain” protentions that provide for a sense of 
agency. The sense of previous agency is “contained” 
in the retentional sense as agency and ownership. This 
makes good sense. While longitudinal retention thus 
holds the protended moments together, transverse 
retention links happenings to one another as events. 
Protentions and their fulfilments, similarly, have their 
longitudinal aspect, consecutively linking from 
moment to moment, or, in the transverse, protending 
toward unities interpreted as events in themselves. A 
question we should ask at this point, however, is this: 
is there a distinction to be made with respect to the 
longitudinal and transverse aspects of protention and 
retention that impacts upon these considerations of 
agency and ownership? Gallagher (2005, p. 193) 
notes that, for Husserl, transverse retention is only 
possible on the basis of its longitudinal aspect; that is, 
the retention of objective content is dependent on 
consciousness as retentional. Given Gallagher’s 
assumption of symmetry with respect to transverse 
and longitudinal aspects, the same must hold for 
protention. We see, therefore, that it is the 
longitudinal aspect of protention that is crucial for a 
sense of agency in Gallagher’s account, although he 
never explicitly addresses this issue. In fact, after 
invoking the distinction, Gallagher does not again 
refer to the longitudinal and transverse aspects of 
protention. It must be the case that the longitudinal 
aspect of protention is being put forward by Gallagher 
as the carrier of the sense of agency, as transverse 
protention can be unfulfilled and thus absent without 
there being any impact on the sense of agency. 
However, if for some reason longitudinal protention 
failed or was interrupted, then there would be no 
protention whatsoever and thus no sense of agency, 
which is what Gallagher requires.  
 
Following Gallagher’s examples, and re-introducing 
this distinction, it appears that his analysis faces some 
problems. We recall here that, in the case of active 
thinking, protention provides the sense of where the 
thinking is heading “as it is being generated or 
developed”. If we divide the protentional aspect into 
its longitudinal and transverse moments, we see that 
there is a protention that is ahead of the thinking itself 
in moments that are serially linked (i.e. longitudinal), 
and that there is a protention that prefigures the 
intended objects as a part of a series that may or may 
not be fulfilled (i.e. transverse). Not only is the latter 
transverse protention dependent on the former 
longitudinal protention, but only the former could 
provide for a sense of agency. In the case of what 
Gallagher calls passive thinking, we do not have a 
sense of agency, however. Here there may be a 
transverse protention, giving us a sense of where 
these thoughts are heading, or there may be a lack of 
transverse protention, meaning that there will be 
temporary uncertainty about the direction these 
thoughts are taking. In the latter case, there may be 
some surprise involved in their occurrence. However, 
longitudinal protention is working in both cases, in so 
far as, in these examples, I retain a projective sense of 
“what I am about to experience”. It may be the case 
that I am unsure about what the content will be  -  that 
is, transverse protention may be either fulfilled or 
unfulfilled  -  but I retain a protentional sense of what 
will be occurring in my stream of consciousness in 
the immediate future.  
 
Let us be more exact. Rodemeyer (2003), working 
from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts, writes: 
 
Husserl says that, if what I am expecting 
does not occur, there remains an empty 
protention that is not fulfilled. In the cases 
of specific events, I will expect the ongoing 
event to continue. If it does not, then I am 
no longer dealing with fulfilled but empty 
protentions, which will then adjust 
themselves to the new situation. Thus the 
very first “moment” of a completely new 
situation will not be apprehended as 
fulfilled until it is part of my retention, 
when the interrelation of retention and 
protention will once again allow me to 
form protentions towards the continuance 
of this new situation. (p. 133) 
 
In terms of the above, transverse protention, in its 
protending of the current object, event, or situation, 
will be unfulfilled; that is, there will be an empty 
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protention that will be recognised in retention, which 
will then immediately motivate realignment for the 
next protention. At no point, however, would 
longitudinal protention be similarly caught off guard. 
I retain my projective sense that these experiences 
will be experiences occurring for me. There is thus an 
ingredient missing in this analysis even after we 
introduce the distinction between longitudinal and 
traverse protention.  
 
Gallagher suggests that, if the protentional function 
itself fails, “thinking would continue to happen, but 
there would be neither a sense of agency, nor a sense 
that these thoughts were being passively generated in 
my cognitive system, even though they were 
appearing in my stream of consciousness. I would be 
unready for such thoughts. They would appear as if 
from nowhere, and their occurrence would be sudden 
and unexpected” (2005, p. 194; italics added). The 
reference here needs to be to the longitudinal aspect 
of protention, as he suggests that there would not be 
even a sense that these thoughts were passively 
generated; as such, it must be the case that there is a 
momentary failure of longitudinal protention such 
that I do not have a (even indeterminate) projective 
sense. Gallagher continues: “… thought generation, 
like any experience, is normally protentional. Without 
protention, thought continues, but it appears already 
made, not generated by me” (2005, p. 195; italics 
added). However, as we have seen, transverse 
protention is grounded in and dependent on 
longitudinal protention, and if longitudinal protention 
failed, there would be no transverse protention. If this 
were the case, then thought would not continue in the 
absence of protention. In the case of intended 
thoughts, I require transverse protention, and, in the 
absence of longitudinal protention, this is impossible. 
In the case of passively generated thoughts, if 
longitudinal protention was working, then they would 
arrive as empty protentions; if longitudinal protention 
was not working, however, then they could not arrive 
at all. Let me explain this latter point further with 
reference to perception since, as Gallagher notes, all 
experience is protentional. 
 
On the perceptual level, protention is necessary for 
“moving beyond” the “now”, and allows for the 
possibility of our shifting focus and attention, 
directing our interest towards new things, and so 
forth. The “primal impression” is not the condition for 
the possibility of temporalising consciousness; rather,  
“presence” or the “zone of actualisation” is founded 
by the subtentional functioning of protention and 
retention. No protention, no perception: instead, only 
a transient momentary percept would be present. 
Without protention, perception would be restricted to 
the present moment, unable to “move into other 
presentations because nothing would take me beyond 
this very moment … [at best I] would not be able to 
connect each moment’s presentation with the next” 
(Rodemeyer, 2003, p. 136). But, precisely at this 
point, it becomes clear that some psychotic 
phenomena do, in fact, show widespread disruptions 
to, or interruptions in, temporal synthesis, and 
particularly protention. As one patient describes: 
“Everything is in bits … . It’s like a photograph that’s 
torn in bits and put together again … . If you move 
it’s frightening. The picture you had in your head is 
still there but it’s broken up. If I move there’s a new 
picture that I have to put together again” (as cited in 
Cutting, 1997, p. 176). And this is exactly the type of 
experience we would expect to occur if there were 
some kind of systematic interruption to protention. 
Following Gallagher’s insight, the disruption of the 
protentional flow perfectly accounts for the patient’s 
inability to synthesise the new aspects and objects 
brought into view through movement.  
 
Moreover, protention is the condition for not only the 
possibility of fulfilment, but also appresentations and 
apperceptions. Rodemeyer (2003) observes that, 
“while we know that appresentations are now, not in 
the future ([as] they are embedded in a presentation), 
actualised consciousness alone does not allow for the 
possibility of being beyond this zone of actualisation” 
(p. 136). Thus, without protention, what we would 
expect to see is the world in something like two-
dimensions, where objects could not be intended as 
wholes. There would be no horizonality. Chapman 
(1966) cites a self-report in the section on visual 
disturbances where the patient explains: “I see things 
flat. Whenever there is a sudden change I see it flat 
.… . There’s no depth, but if I take time to look at 
things I can pick out the pieces like a jigsaw puzzle 
… . Moving is like a motion picture. If you move, the 
picture in front of you changes” (p. 230). Despite 
such evidence in support of the notion of disruptions 
to temporal synthesis, however, it is clear that, even 
though protention is a necessary precondition for 
agency, protention cannot be the sole carrier of the 
sense of agency. Moreover, it remains unclear what 
could cause these kinds of interruptions in temporal 
experience. With regard to the former point, it is 
interesting to note that Gallagher (2005) himself 
states that protention is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the sense of agency. The solution is that 
active intentional directedness on the part of the 
subject is required for a sense of agency. Agency is 
built into active intentionality and not protention. 
Protention, and temporalising consciousness in 
general, are necessary preconditions for the formation 
of intentionality. However, protention simply cannot 
do as much work as Gallagher needs it to do; it 
cannot, on its own, carry the sense of agency. Only 
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intentional directedness on the part of the subject can 
fully provide for the sense of agency. If protention 
fails, it is true that there will be no sense of agency, 
but there can be no thought insertion either. Without 
protention there is no intention.  Everything stops and 




I have argued that protention cannot carry the sense of 
agency even though it is a necessary precondition for 
it, and that a failure in a protentional mechanism 
cannot account for the phenomenon of thought 
insertion. Intention and protention are clearly 
interrelated, and both extend ahead of’ their 
fulfilment, but they are not the same. Protention 
founds the intentional act, but intention remains 
indispensable to any full account of agency. I would 
suggest, contra Gallagher, Stephens and Graham, and 
Frith, that thought insertion is likely to be a passive 
type of thinking, for which there is never any sense of 
agency, as opposed to active thinking for which we 
happen to have no sense of agency due to some kind 
of neurocognitive malfunction. There will be no sense 
of agency, not as a result of a failure in protention, but 
because the thoughts were not intentionally brought 
about by the subject. The schizophrenic person may 
come to take them as inserted by another agency for a 
number of reasons  -  due to a general alienation from 
his or her own experiences, the loss of ontological 
security, the coherency and saliency of the 
uncontrollable passive thinking, and so forth  -  and 
focused phenomenological studies are necessary if we 
are to understand why some schizophrenics believe 
that their passive thoughts are inserted by others. 
Passive thoughts need not be, as Stephens and 
Graham have suggested, meaningless snippets of 
language. We often find complex and coherent trains 
of thought occurring to us passively; moreover, it is 
often the case that attempts to suppress passive and 
unwanted thoughts tend to exacerbate their arrival. 
The phenomenology of thinking in schizophrenia 
seems divided between, on the one hand, the felt need 
to actively think through things that would normally 
be matter of course and, on the other, being 
overwhelmed by an automatic passive type of 
thinking that may be interpreted by the subject in a 
number of ways.  
 
The relentlessly occurring passive thoughts may be 
felt to be inserted, heard, or otherwise forced upon the 
patient. In Chapman’s (1966, pp. 225-251) classic 
study of the early symptoms of schizophrenia we find 
these descriptions: 
 
“Nothing settles in my mind  -  not even for 
a second. It just comes in and then it’s out. 
My mind goes away - too many things 
come into my head at once and I lose 
control.” (Case 29) 
 
“I am afraid to move without giving all my 
attention to it, because if I am doing 
something else, I might carry out the wrong 
movement.” (Case 25) 
 
“My thoughts run too fast and I can’t stop 
the train at the right point to make them go 
the right way.” (Case 12) 
 
“I can’t control my thoughts. I can’t keep 
thoughts out. It comes on automatically.” 
(Case 23) 
 
More recent research by Honda et al. (2004) also 
suggests that autochthonous or uncontrollable passive 
thinking is a basic or early symptom of schizophrenia. 
In fact, the authors of this study conclude that 
“autochthonous thinking … may be a fundamental 
symptom of schizophrenia” (Honda et al., 2004, p. 
478). Although none of the reports cited by Chapman 
are reports of thought insertion, we see a number of 
instances in which the patients speak about not being 
able to control their thoughts. It is said that nothing 
settles in the mind, that too many things come in, that 
their thoughts run too fast, that they come into the 
head, that they can’t be controlled, that they come on 
automatically - all of which experiences are indicative 
of a more or less chaotic and uncontrollable type of 
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